The Los Angeles Division

DEA Los Angeles Division

Last fully verified: July 24, 2026

The Drug Enforcement Administration’s Los Angeles Division is one of DEA’s most geographically dispersed domestic field divisions.

It serves:

Southern California;
Nevada;
Hawaii;
Guam;
Saipan.

The division does not serve all of California.

DEA’s live Los Angeles page describes the division as serving Los Angeles, Santa Ana, Ventura, California, Hawaii, Nevada, and Guam. Its contact table separately includes Riverside, Honolulu, Maui, Las Vegas, Reno, and Hagatna. Current Special Agent in Charge Anthony Chrysanthis’s official biography provides the broader description: offices in Southern California, Nevada, Hawaii, Guam, and Saipan.

The public record contains three significant organizational inconsistencies.

First, Riverside appears in the current contact table but is omitted from the jurisdiction heading.

Second, Saipan appears in the current Special Agent in Charge’s official jurisdictional description but is omitted from both the live heading and the public contact table.

Third, DEA’s national Tactical Diversion Squad directory incorrectly places Ventura under Nevada, even though Ventura is in California and the Justice Department separately identifies a DEA Ventura Resident Office Tactical Diversion Squad.

The available official record therefore supports the following description:

The DEA Los Angeles Division serves Southern California through a network centered on Los Angeles, Riverside, Santa Ana, and Ventura; all of Nevada through Las Vegas and Reno; Hawaii through Honolulu and Maui; Guam through Hagatna; and Saipan through an office or post not identified on the live contact page.

DEA does not publish a current county-by-county Southern California boundary on the public pages reviewed for this publication.

Seeds of Vice will not manufacture that boundary from federal judicial districts, metropolitan areas, historical office descriptions, individual prosecutions, or assumptions about where Southern California begins and ends.

The Los Angeles Division investigates international drug-trafficking organizations, illicit fentanyl and methamphetamine distribution, money laundering, drug-related violence, maritime and border-related trafficking, illegal cultivation, and other federal offenses.

It also implements and enforces portions of the federal controlled-substance system governing lawful:

Manufacturers;
Distributors;
Pharmacies;
Hospitals;
Practitioners;
Treatment programs;
Researchers;
Importers and exporters;
Other DEA registrants.

This page concerns that lawful system.

It explains who currently leads the division, which locations and personnel are publicly identified, where DEA’s own directories conflict, what diversion-control infrastructure exists, how California, Nevada, Hawaii, Guam, and Saipan create distinct regulatory layers, what actual Los Angeles-area diversion cases look like, and what available dispensing data can—and cannot—prove about lawful medicine.

The Name Matters

The official organization is the DEA Los Angeles Division.

It is not formally called the “Los Angeles Diversion Division.”

The Los Angeles Division is a regional field division exercising several different DEA missions.

Pharmaceutical diversion control is one component of that broader command.

The national Diversion Control Division is a separate DEA headquarters component responsible for national registration, regulatory, policy, quota, import-export, chemical-control, and pharmaceutical-investigation functions.

DEA describes the national diversion mission as preventing and investigating the movement of controlled pharmaceuticals and listed chemicals away from legitimate sources while also maintaining an adequate and uninterrupted supply for lawful medical, commercial, and scientific purposes.

Los Angeles Division personnel implement and enforce portions of that national system within the division’s regional jurisdiction.

The Los Angeles Division does not independently:

Enact the Controlled Substances Act;
Establish national pharmaceutical production quotas;
Write all national DEA regulations;
Create CDC clinical recommendations;
Issue state medical or pharmacy licenses;
Administer every state prescription-monitoring database;
Establish every hospital or pharmacy policy;
Determine the national medical standard of care.

Its personnel can, depending upon assignment and legal authority:

Inspect DEA registrants;
Review controlled-substance records;
Audit inventories;
Examine ordering, distribution, prescribing, and dispensing;
Investigate thefts and significant losses;
Coordinate with state licensing agencies;
Conduct surveillance;
Use cooperating sources;
Execute warrants;
Make arrests;
Seek administrative action against DEA registrations;
Refer civil or criminal matters for prosecution.

National policy should not be attributed solely to one field division.

A field division should also not be treated as irrelevant when its personnel exercise federal authority over the lawful controlled-substance channel.

A Division Across the Pacific

The Los Angeles Division is not a single metropolitan office with a compact surrounding territory.

It operates across thousands of miles and several separate legal systems.

Southern California

The headquarters is in Los Angeles.

DEA’s current contact table identifies additional California locations in:

Riverside;
Santa Ana;
Ventura.

The live jurisdiction heading names Los Angeles, Santa Ana, and Ventura but omits Riverside, even though Riverside has a current DEA contact number and a separately listed Tactical Diversion Squad.

The official biography of Anthony Chrysanthis uses the broader term Southern California.

That establishes a regional responsibility.

It does not establish a precise public county list.

Nevada

DEA identifies Nevada as part of the Los Angeles Division without limiting the description to a particular region.

The public contact network contains:

Las Vegas;
Reno.

That record supports describing the Los Angeles Division as serving Nevada statewide through those two principal locations.

Hawaii

DEA identifies Hawaii as part of the Los Angeles Division.

The public contact network contains:

Honolulu;
Maui.

Hawaii’s geographic separation means the Los Angeles Division must administer federal controlled-substance responsibilities across an island chain with its own healthcare, pharmacy, transportation, and controlled-substance monitoring systems.

Guam

DEA’s live page identifies Guam and publishes a contact in Hagatna.

Hagatna: (671) 472-7384

The public page does not provide a separate office classification in its accessible text.

This page therefore describes Hagatna as a current public contact location rather than guessing whether its present internal designation is district office, resident office, or post of duty.

Saipan

Anthony Chrysanthis’s current biography expressly includes Saipan within his jurisdiction.

The live Los Angeles page does not:

Mention Saipan in its heading;
Publish a Saipan telephone number;
Provide a Saipan address;
Explain whether Saipan reports through Guam;
Identify its current office classification.

A prior official DEA biography identified a Saipan Post of Duty, but that description concerned the division’s organization during an earlier leadership assignment. It is useful historical evidence, not conclusive proof that the same classification remains current.

This page therefore identifies Saipan as part of the present Los Angeles Division while reporting the absence of a current public contact.

It does not invent one.

Three Public-Record Problems

Riverside Is Missing From the Heading

The live Los Angeles heading states that the division serves Los Angeles, Santa Ana, and Ventura in California.

The same page publishes:

Riverside: (951) 328-6000

DEA’s Tactical Diversion Squad directory also lists Riverside as a California squad location.

Riverside is therefore plainly part of the current public Los Angeles Division network despite its omission from the heading.

Saipan Is Missing From the Contact Page

The current Special Agent in Charge’s biography includes Saipan.

The live contact page does not.

This creates an incomplete public record for residents, registrants, journalists, attorneys, and public officials attempting to determine how to contact DEA within that portion of the division.

Ventura Is Listed Under Nevada

DEA’s national Tactical Diversion Squad directory lists:

Nevada: Las Vegas, Reno, Ventura

That placement is geographically wrong.

The Justice Department separately identifies a DEA Ventura Resident Office Tactical Diversion Squad, confirming that the Ventura unit is a California operation.

This page treats Ventura as California.

It does not reproduce a federal directory error merely because the error appears on an official webpage.

DEA requires registrants to maintain accurate records of controlled-substance transactions.

The public is entitled to expect DEA to maintain an equally intelligible record of its own offices and enforcement units.

Headquarters

The Los Angeles Division headquarters is publicly listed at:

DEA Los Angeles Division
255 East Temple Street
17th Floor
Los Angeles, California 90012

Main telephone: (213) 621-6700

The headquarters is the most reliable published contact for:

Questions about the Southern California boundary;
Saipan contact information;
Office classifications;
Unclear divisional reporting structures;
Diversion matters not assigned to a public local contact.

Current Leadership

Anthony Chrysanthis

Special Agent in Charge

As of July 24, 2026, Anthony Chrysanthis is the publicly identified Special Agent in Charge of the DEA Los Angeles Division.

He assumed the position in January 2026.

DEA states that he is responsible for the daily operations of offices in Southern California, Nevada, Hawaii, Guam, and Saipan.

Chrysanthis is a 29-year DEA veteran.

He served as Deputy Special Agent in Charge of the Los Angeles Division from 2022 through 2025.

In that position, DEA credits him with overseeing Operation Mandarin Mecca, which the agency describes as the largest operation in Los Angeles Division history. The June 2025 operation involved approximately 500 multiagency personnel, 78 arrests, 780 acres, and more than 2,000 greenhouses connected to suspected illegal marijuana cultivation sites in the Southern California desert.

Beginning in April 2024, Chrysanthis also served approximately four months as Acting Special Agent in Charge of the San Diego Division.

From 2016 through 2022, he served as an Assistant Special Agent in Charge in Los Angeles.

Before that, he worked in DEA’s Office of Professional Responsibility, eventually becoming a Senior Inspector responsible for internal-affairs investigations affecting the western United States, Asia, and the Middle East.

He served as a Los Angeles-based special agent and group supervisor between 1997 and 2010.

His public biography documents professional experience in:

Federal drug enforcement;
Large multiagency operations;
Internal-affairs investigations;
Executive management;
Interagency coordination;
Drug-trafficking investigations;
Community drug-prevention programs.

It does not identify him as a:

Physician;
Pharmacist;
Pain specialist;
Epidemiologist;
Clinical researcher.

That distinction does not diminish his federal authority.

It identifies the professional and institutional perspective from which the division is led.

Publicly Identified Personnel

DEA does not publish a complete current roster of Los Angeles Division:

Special agents;
Diversion investigators;
Intelligence analysts;
Tactical Diversion Squad members;
Registration specialists;
Task-force officers;
Supervisors;
Attorneys;
Administrative employees.

Seeds of Vice will not construct one from social-media profiles, commercial databases, unsupported directories, or old case announcements.

The following individuals are included because DEA currently identifies them in public-facing roles.

Rosa Valle-Lopez

Media Inquiries

DEA identifies Rosa Valle-Lopez as the Los Angeles Division’s media contact.

Telephone: (571) 387-5045

The current page does not publish an email address for her.

SA K. Vo

Special Agent Recruitment

DEA identifies SA K. Vo as the division’s special-agent recruitment contact.

Telephone: (571) 387-6615
Email: LOSANGELESSPECIALAGENTRECRUITER@dea.gov

Ruth Morales

Community Outreach

DEA identifies Ruth Morales as the division’s community-outreach contact.

Telephone: (213) 604-2083
Email: Ruth.M.Morales@dea.gov

Community outreach is distinct from diversion investigation.

A prevention or public-engagement role should not be confused with authority over:

Registration inspections;
Administrative proceedings;
Pharmacy audits;
Practitioner investigations;
Criminal pharmaceutical cases.

No Current Public Diversion Leadership Roster

The live Los Angeles page does not identify a current named:

Diversion Program Manager;
Diversion Outreach Coordinator;
Tactical Diversion Squad supervisor;
Diversion Group supervisor;
Registration Program Specialist.

The absence of a public name does not establish that a position is vacant.

It means the present public record does not support identifying the employee.

Current Public Contact Locations

California

Los Angeles headquarters: (213) 621-6700
Riverside: (951) 328-6000
Santa Ana: (714) 647-4900
Ventura: (805) 383-6454

Hawaii

Honolulu: (808) 541-1930
Maui: (808) 244-1136

Nevada

Las Vegas: (702) 759-8000
Reno: (775) 327-8900

Guam

Hagatna: (671) 472-7384

Saipan

Saipan is included in the current Special Agent in Charge’s jurisdictional description, but DEA’s live contact page publishes no separate telephone number or address.

Questions involving Saipan should therefore be directed to the Los Angeles headquarters or the Guam contact unless DEA publishes a current Saipan contact.

Office Classifications

DEA’s Los Angeles page displays a legend for:

Division Office;
District Office;
Resident Office;
Post of Duty Office.

The accessible page text does not clearly associate each current contact location with one of those classifications.

A prior official DEA biography identified:

Honolulu as a District Office;
Las Vegas as a District Office;
Reno as a Resident Office;
Guam as a Resident Office;
Saipan as a Post of Duty.

That description concerned the responsibilities of a deputy special agent in charge beginning in 2020.

Because DEA’s current page does not reproduce those classifications, this publication will not silently treat every historical designation as current.

One current classification is independently supported.

The Justice Department identified a Ventura Resident Office Tactical Diversion Squad in a May 2025 case later updated in January 2026.

Diversion-Control Infrastructure

DEA’s current national Tactical Diversion Squad directory identifies the following squads relevant to the Los Angeles Division.

Southern California

Los Angeles;
Orange County;
Riverside;
Ventura.

Ventura is incorrectly printed under Nevada in the directory, but DOJ’s case record confirms the Ventura Resident Office Tactical Diversion Squad.

Hawaii

Honolulu.

Nevada

Las Vegas;
Reno.

No Separately Published Squad

The national directory does not separately list a Tactical Diversion Squad in:

Maui;
Guam;
Hagatna;
Saipan.

That does not prove diversion investigators never work in those locations.

It means the current national directory does not publish a separately named Tactical Diversion Squad there.

What a Tactical Diversion Squad Is

DEA describes Tactical Diversion Squads as multiagency units combining DEA personnel and authority with federal, state, and local law-enforcement resources.

Their purpose is to investigate, disrupt, and dismantle individuals or organizations suspected of violating controlled-substance or listed-chemical laws involving the diversion of lawful pharmaceutical products.

DEA states that these squads can:

Combine information held by separate agencies;
Coordinate investigations across judicial districts;
Support traditional Diversion Groups;
Make arrests;
Purchase evidence;
Pay for information;
Conduct surveillance;
Execute search warrants.

That is significant.

Diversion control is sometimes described as though it consisted only of:

Licensing;
Paperwork;
Pharmacy education;
Registration renewal;
Recordkeeping guidance.

Tactical Diversion Squads possess conventional criminal-investigative capabilities.

A matter can originate from:

A registration inspection;
An inventory discrepancy;
A suspicious-order report;
A dispensing complaint;
A forged prescription;
A theft or significant-loss report;
A report from an employee;
A report from a patient;
Information from a professional board;
Information from another law-enforcement agency;
Prescription-monitoring data;
An undercover investigation.

If investigators believe the evidence supports criminal conduct, a matter can develop into surveillance, cooperating-source activity, evidence purchases, warrants, arrests, and prosecution.

That does not mean every inspection becomes a criminal case.

It means the system possesses both regulatory and criminal capacity.

Traditional Diversion Work

Traditional diversion investigators are regulatory specialists.

Their work can involve:

DEA registrations;
Compliance inspections;
Initial and biennial inventories;
Ordering records;
Distribution records;
Prescription records;
Pharmacy dispensing records;
Theft and significant-loss reporting;
Physical security;
Suspicious-order systems;
Administrative registration proceedings;
Interviews with registrants and employees;
Coordination with professional licensing authorities.

Tactical Diversion Squads add criminal-investigative methods and law-enforcement personnel to that regulatory structure.

A registrant may therefore encounter DEA through different legal pathways.

A matter may remain administrative.

It may produce corrective action or a civil settlement.

It may result in professional discipline.

It may become a criminal prosecution.

Those outcomes must not be treated as interchangeable.

Broader Enforcement Is Not Diversion Control

Anthony Chrysanthis’s public biography emphasizes major drug-trafficking organizations, violent crime, illegal cultivation, interagency enforcement, and community drug-prevention work. The division’s public page also promotes Operation Engage Orange County and provides a separate address for families affected by drug-caused deaths.

Those programs should not be used to imply that:

Every controlled-substance patient belongs to a trafficking investigation;
Every practitioner is being examined as part of a cartel case;
Every prescription drug originated in lawful medicine;
Illicit fentanyl is equivalent to pharmaceutical fentanyl;
A patient receiving long-term treatment is comparable to a black-market distributor.

The Los Angeles Division operates against illicit trafficking and within the lawful pharmaceutical system.

Those missions can intersect.

They are not the same mission.

The Official Diversion-Control Mission

DEA’s stated diversion mission contains two responsibilities.

Prevent Diversion

DEA is responsible for protecting the lawful channel against conduct including:

Theft;
Fraud;
Forgery;
Record falsification;
Employee diversion;
Unlawful prescribing;
Unlawful dispensing;
Improper distribution;
Security failures;
Suspicious ordering;
Transfer into black markets.

Preserve Legitimate Supply

DEA also accepts responsibility for maintaining an adequate and uninterrupted supply for legitimate medical, commercial, and scientific purposes.

Legitimate medical purposes include controlled substances used in:

Surgery;
Emergency medicine;
Cancer treatment;
Acute pain treatment;
Chronic pain treatment;
Palliative care;
End-of-life care;
Treatment of substance-use disorders;
Veterinary medicine;
Scientific research.

The legitimate-supply obligation is not decorative language.

It is part of the agency’s stated mission.

A complete evaluation must therefore ask:

What unlawful diversion did the division prevent?

What legitimate access remained available?

Counting arrests, convictions, suspended registrations, closed pharmacies, surrendered registrations, and seized medication answers only the first question.

The Closed System of Distribution

Federal controlled-substance law operates through what the government calls a closed system of distribution.

The system regulates controlled substances from lawful manufacture and importation through distribution, prescribing, dispensing, administration, and disposal.

Many participants must hold DEA registrations and comply with federal requirements involving:

Security;
Inventories;
Ordering;
Records;
Prescribing;
Dispensing;
Theft and loss reporting;
Suspicious orders;
Transfers;
Disposal;
Import and export activity.

DEA registration is not ceremonial.

For many healthcare professionals and businesses, it is the federal authorization required to participate in the controlled-substance channel.

A state medical license does not replace DEA registration.

A state pharmacy license does not replace DEA registration.

The patient experiences the closed system through every authorized participant standing between pharmaceutical manufacture and lawful medical use.

California CURES

California’s Controlled Substance Utilization Review and Evaluation System—CURES—is administered by the California Department of Justice.

It is not a DEA database.

CURES stores reported dispensing information involving Schedule II, III, IV, and V controlled substances.

Records can include:

Patient identifying information;
Prescriber name and DEA number;
Pharmacy information;
Date dispensed;
Drug name;
Strength;
Quantity;
Days supplied;
Refill information;
Payment method.

With specified exceptions, California requires an authorized practitioner to consult CURES before first prescribing, ordering, administering, or furnishing a Schedule II, III, or IV controlled substance to a patient and at least once every six months while that substance remains part of treatment.

California pharmacies, clinics, and other covered dispensers generally must report Schedule II through V dispensing information no later than one working day after releasing the controlled substance to the patient or representative. Veterinarian reporting may occur within seven days.

Effective January 1, 2026, California stopped requiring testosterone and mifepristone dispensing to be reported to CURES and began removing prior records for those drugs.

CURES information may be provided to appropriate federal, state, and local public agencies for authorized disciplinary, civil, or criminal purposes.

That does not make CURES a federal database.

State monitoring and federal enforcement remain institutionally distinct.

Nevada Prescription Monitoring

Nevada’s Prescription Monitoring Program is administered through state institutions, including the Nevada State Board of Pharmacy.

It is not operated by the DEA Los Angeles Division.

Nevada’s monitoring structure covers transactions involving Schedule II, III, IV, and V controlled substances. State requirements include review of a patient’s monitoring report before certain initial controlled-substance prescriptions and additional review during extended treatment. Nevada also imposes separate state requirements for some treatment continuing beyond 30 or 90 days.

Nevada law, professional-board requirements, Medicaid rules, pharmacy practices, and DEA enforcement should not be presented as a single institution.

They can interact.

They are legally distinct.

Hawaii Prescription Drug Monitoring Program

Hawaii’s Prescription Drug Monitoring Program is administered by the Hawaii Department of Law Enforcement’s Narcotics Enforcement Division.

In 2024, Hawaii announced an enhanced system integrating controlled-substance prescription history into participating electronic health records through a state vendor arrangement.

The Hawaii program is a state monitoring system.

It is not a DEA database merely because DEA offices in Honolulu and Maui operate within the same controlled-substance environment.

Guam and Saipan Monitoring Limits

The public records reviewed confirm that Guam and Saipan fall within the Los Angeles Division’s federal jurisdictional structure.

They did not provide a comparably clear, current, stable official account of:

The present Guam prescription-monitoring administrator;
All covered schedules;
Current prescriber-consultation requirements;
A current Saipan monitoring-system administrator;
How territorial information is routinely shared with DEA.

This page will not fill those gaps with assumptions.

An unavailable public fact is reported as unavailable.

It is not replaced with a convenient generalization from California, Nevada, or Hawaii.

The Federal and Local Layers

A practitioner or pharmacy within the Los Angeles Division may be subject to some combination of:

Territorial or state professional licensing;
State or territorial controlled-substance law;
DEA registration;
Federal prescribing and dispensing rules;
Prescription-monitoring requirements;
Hospital credentialing;
Insurer authorization;
Corporate pharmacy policies;
Distributor allocation decisions;
Professional-board standards.

These requirements come from different institutions.

They should not all be attributed to DEA.

They also should not be treated as unrelated when their combined effect determines whether a patient receives medicine.

A lawful patient may encounter a denial because of:

A federal registration problem;
State or territorial law;
A licensing-board requirement;
A pharmacy policy;
A distributor restriction;
An insurer;
A hospital;
A prescriber’s clinical judgment;
Fear of enforcement;
Medication availability;
Transportation and supply limitations.

Accurate responsibility requires identifying which institution made which decision.

What the Los Angeles Division Can Do

Depending upon the evidence and legal process, Los Angeles Division personnel can:

Conduct regulatory inspections;
Review controlled-substance records;
Audit inventories;
Examine ordering and distribution patterns;
Investigate thefts and significant losses;
Investigate prescribing and dispensing;
Interview registrants and employees;
Coordinate with professional boards;
Work with federal, state, territorial, and local law enforcement;
Use subpoenas and other compulsory process;
Conduct surveillance;
Use cooperating sources;
Execute warrants;
Seize evidence;
Make arrests;
Seek suspension, restriction, surrender, or revocation of a DEA registration;
Refer civil or criminal matters to prosecutors.

The precise authority depends upon the nature of the matter and the legal procedure being used.

What the Los Angeles Division Does Not Do

The division does not ordinarily:

Examine an individual pain patient;
Diagnose the cause of that patient’s pain;
Observe the patient’s daily functional improvement;
Perform surgery;
Evaluate every available treatment;
Assume the treating clinician’s ethical duty;
Issue state or territorial professional licenses;
Make every pharmacy dispensing decision;
Decide every insurance authorization;
Write every hospital or clinic policy.

The division therefore does not bear sole responsibility for every:

Refused prescription;
Involuntary taper;
Pharmacy denial;
Delayed postoperative dose;
Insurance refusal;
Patient unable to locate pain treatment.

DEA nevertheless bears a distinct federal responsibility.

It controls access to federal registration and possesses enforcement authority capable of influencing institutional behavior beyond the person or business directly investigated.

That influence should not be exaggerated into sole causation.

It should not be minimized into irrelevance.

How Diversion Control Works in Practice

Actual Los Angeles Division cases demonstrate several different points in the pharmaceutical system:

Corporate pharmacy records;
Retail pharmacy ownership;
Prescriber-pharmacist cooperation;
Fraudulent electronic prescriptions;
Medical distribution of ketamine;
Clinics selling prescriptions for cash.

They also demonstrate different legal outcomes.

A civil settlement is not a criminal conviction.

An indictment is not a conviction.

A guilty plea is not an unresolved allegation.

A jury verdict is not merely an accusation.

Rite Aid Corporation

In March 2017, Rite Aid paid $834,200 to resolve federal Controlled Substances Act allegations involving certain Los Angeles pharmacies.

The government alleged that the pharmacies dispensed or recorded controlled substances using incorrect or invalid practitioner DEA registration numbers at least 1,298 times.

The settlement also addressed allegations that pharmacies dispensed controlled-substance prescriptions on at least 63 occasions after the relevant practitioner’s DEA registration had been revoked for cause.

Rite Aid did not admit liability.

Before the agreement, the company implemented a program intended to validate prescriber DEA registration numbers.

The investigation was conducted by DEA’s Office of Diversion Control within the Los Angeles Field Division.

This matter demonstrates why registration and record validation matter.

It does not establish that every affected prescription lacked a legitimate medical purpose.

The settlement resolved compliance allegations involving the authorization under which prescriptions were processed.

Global Compounding Pharmacy

Global Compounding Pharmacy was a West Los Angeles pharmacy owned by brothers Berry Kabov and Dalibor Kabov.

Following a federal jury trial, both men were convicted of offenses involving:

Conspiracy to distribute narcotics;
Distribution of oxycodone;
Importation of controlled drugs;
Illegal importation of anabolic steroids;
Money laundering;
False tax returns.

In March 2019, each brother was sentenced to 121 months in federal prison.

Prosecutors proved that the pharmacy was used to distribute oxycodone, hydromorphone, and hydrocodone to black-market customers across the country.

The evidence included:

Bulk shipments of pills;
Cash deposits and shipments;
Recorded discussions of black-market pill values;
Fraudulent prescriptions;
Identity-theft victims used as supposed patients;
False information reported to California authorities.

Prosecutors stated that more than 300,000 opioid pills reached the black market after the defendants opened the pharmacy.

This was not a disagreement over an unusual treatment plan.

The jury found a criminal distribution operation using a licensed pharmacy as its infrastructure.

Dzung Ahn Pham and Bristol Pharmacy

Dr. Dzung Ahn Pham owned Irvine Village Urgent Care.

Jennifer Thaoyen Nguyen operated Bristol Pharmacy.

Both pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute controlled substances.

In June 2023, Pham received a sentence of 151 months in federal prison and a $35,000 fine.

Nguyen received a 33-month sentence and a $10,000 fine.

Pham admitted writing prescriptions outside the usual course of professional practice and without a legitimate medical purpose, including for people he knew were addicted to the drugs.

The admitted conspiracy involved approximately:

53,693 oxycodone pills;
68,795 hydrocodone pills;
29,286 amphetamine-salt pills.

Pham directed recipients to Nguyen’s pharmacy when other pharmacies would not fill his prescriptions.

The two also used prescriptions for noncontrolled drugs in an effort to reduce warning signs associated with the volume of controlled substances being prescribed and dispensed.

This case involved direct evidence of coordinated unlawful conduct between a prescriber and pharmacist.

It should not be generalized into a presumption that every physician-pharmacy relationship, cash visit, high dosage, or unusual prescription is criminal.

The Fraudulent Electronic-Prescription Scheme

In January 2026, Benjamin Jamal Washington was sentenced to 65 months in federal prison for leading a scheme using stolen physician identities to generate fraudulent electronic prescriptions.

Washington had pleaded guilty to:

Conspiracy to commit wire fraud;
Aggravated identity theft;
Conspiracy to distribute controlled substances.

The conspiracy obtained doctors’ identifying information and DEA registration numbers.

Participants used false identification, compromised telephone numbers, and fraudulent electronic-prescribing accounts to impersonate physicians.

At least 5,600 fraudulent controlled-substance prescriptions were issued, including prescriptions for oxycodone and promethazine with codeine.

Participants collected drugs from pharmacies in several states, including the Los Angeles area, and sold them for profit.

This matter demonstrates a modern form of diversion.

The prescription can appear electronically valid while the prescriber identity, patient encounter, and medical purpose are entirely fabricated.

Preventing that conduct protects both patients and legitimate physicians whose identities and registrations are stolen.

Salvador Plasencia and Ketamine Distribution

Salvador Plasencia was a physician operating a Calabasas urgent-care clinic.

He pleaded guilty to four counts of distributing ketamine and surrendered his California medical license.

In December 2025, he was sentenced to 30 months in federal prison and fined $5,600.

The admitted conduct involved the sale and transfer of ketamine to actor Matthew Perry and Perry’s personal assistant.

According to the plea and sentencing record, Plasencia:

Knew Perry’s history of addiction;
Knew the assistant lacked medical training;
Administered ketamine in Perry’s home and in a vehicle;
Left vials for unsupervised administration;
Continued after a significant adverse reaction;
Distributed 20 vials and tablets over approximately two weeks;
Charged approximately $57,000;
Used his DEA registration to obtain additional ketamine;
Falsified treatment notes after receiving a DEA subpoena.

This case demonstrates the importance of distinguishing a controlled substance’s lawful medical existence from the legitimacy of a particular transfer.

Ketamine has lawful medical uses.

That does not make every sale, administration, or transfer medically legitimate.

The controlled-substance system exists to make that distinction through evidence.

ChiroMed Clinics

In April 2026, clinic operator Justin Douglas Cozart was sentenced to 216 months in federal prison after a jury convicted him of controlled-substance and money-laundering offenses.

The government proved that the operation recruited sham patients to clinics in Inglewood, Santa Ana, Anaheim, and other Southern California locations to obtain oxycodone prescriptions.

The prescriptions were filled, consolidated, and shipped to customers in the Boston area for black-market distribution.

The evidence included prescriptions issued without meaningful examinations and prescriptions issued to an undercover law-enforcement officer.

The case produced nine convictions.

Again, this was not a dispute about whether a documented patient obtained sufficient relief.

The record described sham patients, cash payments, predetermined prescriptions, interstate resale, and no legitimate medical purpose.

The Ventura Resident Office Case

A 2025 prosecution independently confirms the existence of the Ventura Resident Office Tactical Diversion Squad.

A Central Coast defendant admitted using physicians’ credentials to create false medical documents and using the DEA registration number of a deceased doctor to order more than 150,000 controlled-substance tablets.

The drugs included testosterone, codeine, alprazolam, diethylpropion, and phentermine.

The Justice Department identified DEA’s Ventura Resident Office Tactical Diversion Squad as one of the investigating units. Sentencing was scheduled for July 31, 2026, after this page’s verification date.

The guilty plea establishes the admitted offenses.

The future sentence should not be predicted.

Operation Hypocritical Oath

In 2019, DEA and federal prosecutors announced a broad Southern California initiative involving doctors, physician assistants, nurse practitioners, clinic operators, and suspected traffickers.

The operation included:

Criminal charges;
Arrests;
Search warrants;
Administrative actions;
Revocation or loss of DEA prescribing authority.

The announced matters involved allegations of unlawful prescribing, forged prescriptions, stolen prescription materials, direct distribution, unreported dispensing, and compromised DEA registration information.

The operation also demonstrates why legal posture matters.

One nurse practitioner named in the original announcement was later acquitted of all criminal charges.

The Justice Department subsequently updated its release to disclose that result and correct part of its original description.

An arrest is not a conviction.

A government allegation can be contested.

An acquittal must be reported as clearly as an accusation.

What These Cases Establish

The official record establishes that actual diversion within the Los Angeles Division can involve:

Black-market pharmacy sales;
False prescriptions;
Stolen physician identities;
Fraudulent electronic-prescribing accounts;
Use of a deceased physician’s DEA number;
Sham patients;
Cash-for-prescription clinics;
Interstate pill distribution;
False pharmacy records;
Illegal imports;
Unsupervised medical distribution;
Falsified treatment documentation;
Dispensing under invalid or revoked registrations.

These are legitimate subjects of investigation.

The cases do not establish that:

Every opioid prescription is suspicious;
Every high-dose prescription is unlawful;
Every cash-paying patient is participating in diversion;
Every independent pharmacy is a pill mill;
Every patient receiving long-term medicine lacks a legitimate need;
Every controlled-substance treatment must resemble the population average;
Physical dependence is equivalent to addiction;
Addiction is equivalent to criminal distribution;
Unusual treatment is automatically outside professional practice.

Each case must turn on its own evidence.

Administrative, Civil, and Criminal Paths

A diversion matter may result in:

Education or corrective action;
A memorandum of agreement;
A compliance plan;
Civil penalties;
A settlement without an admission of liability;
Immediate suspension of a registration;
Voluntary surrender;
An administrative order to show cause;
Registration revocation;
State professional discipline;
Criminal charges;
A deferred prosecution agreement;
A guilty plea;
A jury conviction;
An acquittal;
No action when evidence is insufficient.

These outcomes have different legal meanings.

An Immediate Suspension Order is an emergency administrative action.

It is not a criminal conviction.

A civil settlement can resolve allegations without an admission of liability.

An indictment or complaint contains accusations.

A guilty plea establishes responsibility for the admitted offense.

A jury conviction establishes responsibility for the proven offense.

An acquittal establishes that the prosecution did not prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

Responsible publication must preserve those distinctions.

The Necessary Distinction

The following circumstances are not equivalent:

A pharmacy selling bulk pills to black-market customers;
A person stealing a physician’s electronic prescribing identity;
A clinic recruiting sham patients;
A physician falsifying medical records;
A pharmacy processing prescriptions under an invalid registration;
A physician treating documented severe pain;
A surgeon treating acute postoperative pain;
An oncologist treating cancer pain;
A palliative-care physician treating a dying person;
A pharmacist resolving a lawful but unusual prescription;
A patient physically dependent after years of authorized treatment;
A person selling medication unlawfully.

The controlled-substance system exists in part to distinguish lawful medical activity from unlawful distribution.

When diversion control preserves that distinction, it protects the lawful channel.

When suspicion becomes generalized, the lawful channel itself can become inaccessible.

How Enforcement Pressure Travels

The following is institutional analysis.

It does not claim that the Los Angeles Division directly ordered every treatment restriction described.

Formal cases are only the most visible part of federal authority.

A physician knows that DEA registration may be essential to practice.

A pharmacy knows that its records, inventories, registrations, orders, and dispensing decisions may be examined.

A hospital knows that missing medication can trigger investigation.

A distributor knows that suspicious customers and ordering patterns can create liability.

Those facts produce necessary safeguards.

They can also produce defensive conduct broader than federal law requires.

A hospital may establish an inflexible dosage rule.

A pharmacy may decline lawful prescriptions it considers difficult or risky.

A physician may stop accepting pain patients because controlled-substance treatment appears professionally dangerous.

A clinic may impose:

Repeated drug testing;
Mandatory pill counts;
One-pharmacy rules;
Treatment contracts;
Mandatory procedures;
Immediate-discharge provisions.

An insurer may transform a clinical recommendation into a rigid payment policy.

DEA does not necessarily order each of those actions.

The institutions nevertheless operate within an environment partly shaped by federal registration and enforcement authority.

A rigorous analysis must distinguish among:

Direct DEA action;
State or territorial law;
Professional-board requirements;
Corporate pharmacy policy;
Hospital risk management;
Insurance restrictions;
Clinical judgment;
Anticipatory compliance;
Individual prejudice or fear.

Without that separation, one institution is blamed for everything while every other institution avoids responsibility for its own decisions.

How This Affects Pain Patients and Lawful Medicine

Diversion control protects patients when:

Stolen medication is recovered;
Counterfeit products are removed;
Forged prescriptions are stopped;
False records are uncovered;
Corrupt employees are identified;
Registrant inventories become accurate;
Stolen practitioner identities are restored;
Registrants knowingly serving black markets are removed.

Control can also affect patients through the reactions of lawful institutions.

Patients may experience:

Difficulty finding a willing practitioner;
Difficulty locating a pharmacy;
Involuntary dosage reductions;
Abrupt discontinuation;
Delayed postoperative medication;
Restrictive treatment contracts;
Repeated drug testing;
Mandatory pill counts;
Refusal because of cannabis use;
Mandatory procedures as a condition of medicine;
Insurance denials;
Pharmacy-stock restrictions;
Treatment based on a numerical threshold rather than individual circumstances.

No one of those outcomes, standing alone, proves misconduct by the Los Angeles Division.

They remain relevant to DEA’s mission because the agency has expressly accepted responsibility for legitimate supply as well as diversion prevention.

A control system cannot evaluate itself solely by counting what it stopped.

It must also ask what lawful treatment remained possible.

CDC’s Current Clinical Position

CDC’s 2022 opioid-prescribing guideline is intended as a clinical tool for individualized, patient-centered decision-making.

CDC states that healthcare systems and payers should not use it to establish rigid dosage or duration rules.

Policies should not produce rapid tapers, abrupt discontinuation, punishment of clinicians who accept patients already receiving opioids, or incentives to reduce doses without regard to individual circumstances.

CDC’s guidance is not:

A replacement for clinical judgment;
A federal controlled-substance law;
A DEA regulation;
A universal dose ceiling;
A justification for abandoning patients.

Guidance can change character as it passes through institutions.

A clinical consideration can become a corporate limit.

A population-level association can become an individual presumption.

A recommendation to proceed carefully can become an order to end treatment.

When that occurs, the resulting policy should be judged on its own terms rather than defended solely by invoking CDC.

Opioid Dispensing Context

Why There Is No Honest Los Angeles Division Rate

The Los Angeles Division includes:

Only part of California;
All of Nevada;
All of Hawaii;
Guam;
Saipan.

DEA does not publish a current county-by-county Southern California boundary.

CDC’s current state dispensing maps cover the 50 states and the District of Columbia, not Guam or Saipan.

Those facts create several methodological barriers.

First, California statewide data include Northern and Central California regions outside the Los Angeles Division.

Second, a Southern California county aggregation cannot be calculated responsibly without an authoritative boundary.

Third, Nevada and Hawaii are separate states with different populations, prescribing environments, healthcare systems, and monitoring requirements.

Fourth, Guam and Saipan are absent from CDC’s state dispensing series.

Therefore:

California, Nevada, and Hawaii statistics may be presented separately as regional background.

They must not be combined and labeled a Los Angeles Division prescribing or dispensing rate.

Why There Is No Single 1984-to-Present Line

No official dataset measures opioid prescribing or dispensing continuously from 1984 through the present using:

A stable geography;
A stable drug definition;
A stable population;
A stable sampling method;
A stable unit of measurement;
A stable healthcare setting.

Historical studies measure different things, including:

Drug mentions during physician visits;
Prescription counts;
Prescriptions per 100 residents;
Dosage;
Morphine milligram equivalents;
Days supplied;
Claims;
Particular insurance populations;
Particular medical settings.

Those measures cannot be fused into one smooth line without misleading the reader.

The national 1980–1981 office-based analgesic-utilization study used elsewhere in this project remains a defensible historical reference.

It is not a Los Angeles Division rate.

It is not a California pharmacy rate.

It cannot be treated as mathematically interchangeable with modern retail prescriptions per 100 residents.

Verified 2024 State Context

CDC reports that the national retail opioid dispensing rate declined from 46.8 prescriptions per 100 persons in 2019 to 35.4 in 2024.

Among the states within the Los Angeles Division’s jurisdiction:

Hawaii: 21.0 prescriptions per 100 persons in 2024;
California: 22.4 prescriptions per 100 persons in 2024.

Those were among the lowest state rates in the country.

The stable text of CDC’s current page reviewed for this publication did not expose a directly citable Nevada 2024 value.

This page does not guess it.

California’s 22.4 figure cannot be called a Los Angeles Division rate because it includes the entire state.

Hawaii’s 21.0 figure describes Hawaii, not Nevada, Southern California, Guam, or Saipan.

The national figure describes the nation.

None independently measures whether an individual patient received appropriate care.

What the CDC Dataset Measures

The current CDC maps report retail-pharmacy-dispensed opioid prescriptions per 100 persons.

The data:

Include new and refilled retail prescriptions;
Include multiple payment sources;
Use projected totals from a large sample of non-hospital retail pharmacies;
Assign geography according to the prescriber’s location;
Exclude mail-order prescriptions;
Exclude methadone dispensed through opioid-treatment programs;
Use Census population estimates.

The maps display state and county data for 2019 through 2024.

The rate measures dispensing.

It does not directly measure:

Pain severity;
Functional improvement;
Medical necessity;
Whether a patient was abandoned;
Whether a dose was reduced voluntarily;
Whether a pharmacy refused a lawful prescription;
Whether a patient could locate treatment;
Whether postoperative pain was adequately treated.

What the Statistics Prove

The available record proves that:

National retail opioid dispensing continued to decline through 2024;
California and Hawaii had comparatively low statewide dispensing rates in 2024;
California statewide data do not equal a Southern California rate;
Separate state rates cannot be merged into a Los Angeles Division rate;
CDC’s state maps do not include Guam or Saipan;
Prescription counts, MME, dosage, drug mentions, and insurance claims are different measures;
No honest analysis can produce one seamless Los Angeles Division line from 1984 through the present.

What the Statistics Cannot Prove

The statistics cannot prove that every prescription removed from the system was unnecessary.

They cannot prove that every prescription remaining in the system was appropriate.

They cannot determine whether a particular patient:

Could walk;
Could sleep;
Could work;
Could recover from surgery;
Could care for family;
Could remain independent;
Received enough medicine;
Received too much medicine;
Was involuntarily tapered;
Was abandoned;
Could find a willing practitioner;
Could locate a pharmacy.

The figures do not count prescriptions never written because a physician refused to accept the patient.

They do not count lawful prescriptions a pharmacy declined to fill.

They do not identify every shortage.

They do not directly measure:

Pain severity;
Quality of life;
Suicide;
Untreated suffering;
Adequacy of postoperative care;
The medical justification for an individual decision.

The numbers measure portions of medicine dispensed.

They do not fully measure the human consequences of what was withheld.

Seeds of Vice Analysis

What the Official Record Proves

Anthony Chrysanthis is the current Special Agent in Charge of the DEA Los Angeles Division.

The division operates in Southern California, Nevada, Hawaii, Guam, and Saipan.

Its public contact network includes:

Los Angeles;
Riverside;
Santa Ana;
Ventura;
Honolulu;
Maui;
Las Vegas;
Reno;
Hagatna.

Saipan is part of the current jurisdiction but lacks a published contact on the live division page.

The public organizational record contains avoidable errors.

Riverside is missing from the jurisdiction heading.

Saipan is missing from the heading and contact table.

Ventura’s Tactical Diversion Squad is incorrectly placed under Nevada in DEA’s national directory.

The division has publicly documented Tactical Diversion Squad capacity in:

Los Angeles;
Orange County;
Riverside;
Ventura;
Honolulu;
Las Vegas;
Reno.

Those squads can support arrests, surveillance, evidence purchases, paid information, and search warrants.

The record also proves that pharmaceutical diversion within the division’s jurisdiction has been real.

Licensed professionals and businesses have:

Sold controlled substances to black-market customers;
Used sham patients;
Generated fraudulent prescriptions;
Stolen physician identities;
Compromised electronic-prescribing systems;
Used invalid or deceased practitioners’ DEA registrations;
Falsified records;
Distributed drugs without legitimate medical purposes.

Those are legitimate subjects of investigation.

The same official record proves that DEA’s mission includes preserving adequate and uninterrupted legitimate supply.

That obligation must remain part of the evaluation.

What the Record Suggests

The division’s geographic structure suggests that DEA prioritizes operational reach over a simple state-by-state organization.

One field division must coordinate federal controlled-substance activity across:

A major continental metropolitan region;
Inland Southern California;
Two entire western states;
An island state;
Western Pacific locations.

That structure creates significant differences in:

Distance;
Transportation;
Pharmacy supply chains;
Medical systems;
State and territorial law;
Prescription-monitoring practices;
Judicial districts;
Access to specialized treatment.

The public record further suggests that Southern California has been a major pharmaceutical-diversion enforcement center.

The cases reviewed here involve:

National pharmacy corporations;
Independent pharmacies;
Physicians;
Pharmacists;
Clinic operators;
Electronic-prescribing systems;
Medical identity theft;
Ketamine distribution;
Interstate black-market sales.

That is a substantial enforcement footprint.

The existence of proven diversion does not answer whether legitimate patients retained adequate access.

DEA does not publish a Los Angeles Division measure showing:

How many legitimate patients lost treatment;
How many pharmacies stopped carrying particular medicines;
How many practitioners left pain care;
How many lawful prescriptions went unfilled;
How many patients were rapidly tapered;
Whether replacement care existed after a registration was surrendered;
How island and territorial supply disruptions affected controlled medicine;
Whether patients in Maui, Guam, or Saipan had meaningful alternatives after a provider or pharmacy stopped participating.

The absence of those measurements does not prove that every enforcement action harmed access.

It means the legitimate-supply half of DEA’s mission remains much less visible in the public performance record.

What Seeds of Vice Concludes

Diversion control has a legitimate purpose.

A fabricated electronic prescription is not medical judgment.

A stolen DEA registration is not lawful prescribing.

A pharmacy selling bulk opioids to black-market customers is not treating pain.

A clinic recruiting sham patients is not legitimate medicine.

A physician falsifying records to conceal drug sales is not individualized care.

Investigating those acts protects patients and preserves the lawful channel.

The patient who legitimately needs controlled medicine is also part of that lawful channel.

That patient is not an accidental exception to the system.

The patient is one of the reasons the system exists.

The Los Angeles Division should therefore be judged by both halves of DEA’s mission.

Does it detect and stop actual diversion?

Does it preserve adequate and uninterrupted access for legitimate medical needs?

Does it distinguish documented fraud from unusual but lawful treatment?

Does it recognize the difference between physical dependence, addiction, and criminal distribution?

Does it measure the effect of enforcement on practitioners who committed no crime?

Does it identify when hospitals, insurers, clinics, distributors, or pharmacies impose restrictions federal law never required?

Does it determine whether patients retain access after a practitioner, pharmacy, or distributor leaves the lawful channel?

Does it account for the particular supply challenges facing Hawaii, Guam, Maui, and Saipan?

Does it protect patients from counterfeit and stolen drugs without treating every patient as a likely source of diversion?

Does it regard a declining prescription line as evidence requiring interpretation—or as proof of success by itself?

Control alone is not enough.

Availability alone is not enough.

A system permitting theft, fraud, falsification, identity theft, sham prescribing, and black-market distribution is unsafe.

A system in which lawful medicine exists in statutes and warehouses but cannot be obtained by legitimate patients is also unsafe.

The proper standard is lawful control and lawful availability.

California and Hawaii now report some of the lowest retail opioid dispensing rates in the United States.

The burden is not merely to display those numbers and call them progress.

The burden is to prove:

What improved;
Who was protected;
Which harms were prevented;
Which harms were created;
Whether legitimate supply remained adequate;
Whether patients retained individualized care;
Whether the lawful, harmless patient left without medicine still had a lawful place to go.

Contact Information

Headquarters

DEA Los Angeles Division
255 East Temple Street
17th Floor
Los Angeles, California 90012

Main telephone: (213) 621-6700

Media Inquiries

Rosa Valle-Lopez
(571) 387-5045

Special Agent Recruitment

SA K. Vo
(571) 387-6615
LOSANGELESSPECIALAGENTRECRUITER@dea.gov

Community Outreach

Ruth Morales
(213) 604-2083
Ruth.M.Morales@dea.gov

California Contacts

Riverside: (951) 328-6000
Santa Ana: (714) 647-4900
Ventura: (805) 383-6454

Hawaii Contacts

Honolulu: (808) 541-1930
Maui: (808) 244-1136

Nevada Contacts

Las Vegas: (702) 759-8000
Reno: (775) 327-8900

Guam Contact

Hagatna: (671) 472-7384

Saipan

No separate current Saipan contact is published on DEA’s live Los Angeles Division page. Questions should be directed to the Los Angeles headquarters or Guam contact pending publication of a current local number.

Sources and Methodology

This page was assembled primarily from current official records published by:

The Drug Enforcement Administration;
DEA’s Diversion Control Division;
The United States Department of Justice;
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention;
The California Department of Justice;
The California State Board of Pharmacy;
Nevada state authorities;
The Hawaii Department of Law Enforcement.

Official DEA pages were compared with one another rather than presumed to be synchronized.

The current jurisdiction was determined from:

DEA’s live Los Angeles Division page;
Anthony Chrysanthis’s current biography;
His January 2026 appointment announcement;
Current public contact listings;
Current Tactical Diversion Squad records;
Current and historical official office descriptions.

Where DEA’s records conflicted, the conflict was disclosed.

Riverside was included because it has a current Los Angeles Division contact and a listed Tactical Diversion Squad despite being omitted from the jurisdiction heading.

Saipan was included because the current Special Agent in Charge’s biography expressly places it within his jurisdiction despite its omission from the contact page.

Ventura was treated as California because DOJ identifies the Ventura Resident Office Tactical Diversion Squad, notwithstanding DEA’s national directory placing Ventura under Nevada.

No county-by-county Southern California boundary was invented.

No historical office classification was automatically represented as current.

Personnel were included only when current official records publicly identified them.

No employee roster was constructed from:

Social-media profiles;
Commercial databases;
Old assignments;
Unsupported directories.

Enforcement matters were described according to their legal posture.

Allegations remained allegations.
Settlements were not described as convictions.
Guilty pleas were identified as admissions of criminal responsibility.
Jury convictions were distinguished from charges.
Acquittals were disclosed.
Future sentences were not predicted.

California CURES, Nevada’s Prescription Monitoring Program, and Hawaii’s Prescription Drug Monitoring Program were identified as state systems rather than DEA databases.

No unsupported current monitoring-system description was created for Guam or Saipan.

Dispensing measures were kept separate according to geography and definition.